

Functional Safety and Linux

Maxime Ripard

Senior Principal Software Engineer

The Automotive Software Revolution




A Car in the 80s



- ▶ No ABS, no Electronic Stability Program (ESP), no active suspension
- ▶ Thermal Engine, no injection, no turbo, 60bhp on a good day.
- ▶ No Airbags
- ▶ No Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)
- ▶ No In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) (radio and cassette player in option)
- ▶ Basically no software



A Car Now (Allegedly)



- ▶ Hybrid or EV
- ▶ ADAS: ESP, lane keeping, adaptive cruise control, park assist, autonomous driving, etc.
- ▶ Airbags, Emergency Braking, etc.
- ▶ Can run Doom (or navigation, whatever)
- ▶ Software is basically everywhere



(Mixed) Criticality

- ▶ Not all features are equally critical
- ▶ Some are life-critical (braking), some are just about comfort (radio)
- ▶ Industry shift from multiple processing components to a central one
 - COVID Chip Shortages
 - User now expects the system to be updated regularly
 - Margins!
- ▶ That component will have to handle various criticality levels



ISO 26262

Functional Safety For Road vehicles



Enter ISO 26262

- ▶ Ratified in 2011, revised in 2018
- ▶ Apply to all road vehicles but mopeds
- ▶ Considered an industry standard, but not mandatory
- ▶ Only deals with functional safety, ie. making sure that electronics behaves as it should
- ▶ Does so by introducing risk levels and associated requirements
- ▶ Classification based on the severity of the consequences of a defect, the probability of it occurring, and the probability of the driver or a passenger mitigating it.



Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) Criterias

- ▶ Severity (S0 to S3)
 - The severity of injury a defect could cause, from no injuries (S0) to life-threatening or fatal injuries (S3)
- ▶ Exposure (E0 to E4)
 - The expected frequency of an injury, from incredibly unlikely (E0) to high (E4)
- ▶ Controllability (C0 to C3)
 - The likelihood of the driver preventing the injury from controllable (C0) to difficult to control or uncontrollable (C3)



ASIL

- ▶ ASIL-D: Potentially Fatal (S3), High Probability of Injury (E4), Uncontrollable (C3)
- ▶ Every reduction of any criteria brings the level down by one, down to ASIL-A
- ▶ Below ASIL-A is Quality Managed (QM)
- ▶ QM means that all risks are tolerable from a safety perspective. Standard development practices are sufficient.



ASIL (cont.)

- ▶ ASIL-D: Total loss of braking
- ▶ ASIL-C: Cruise Control, Loss of rear braking
- ▶ ASIL-B: Head Lights, Brake Lights
- ▶ ASIL-A: Tail Lights
- ▶ QM: The Weather widget on the dashboard
- ▶ ASIL-C and -D highly recommend formal methods, and require verification and validation.
- ▶ Anything below is less constrained



Freedom From Interference (FFI)

- ▶ The “absence of cascading failures between components that could lead to the violation of [some] safety requirement.”
- ▶ Spatial Interference: one task affects the memory of another
- ▶ Temporal Interference: one task affects the execution of another
- ▶ Resource Interference: one task affects a resource shared with another task, or its access to it





ISO 26262 Implementation





General architectures

- ▶ The FFI concept falls nicely into the age-old concept of CPU and memory isolation
- ▶ Different takes on it:
 - Discrete Physical Devices
 - Heterogeneous Systems
 - VMs
 - Containers
 - Process sandboxing



Discrete Devices






Doing it with Linux?

- ▶ Temporal Interference?
 - Scheduler, PREEMPT_RT, cgroup, etc.
- ▶ Spatial Interference?
 - Process Address Space, cgroup, containers, etc.
- ▶ Resource Interference?
 - Partitioning, QoS, Arbitration, etc.
- ▶ Plus usual issues for embedded devices
 - Software updates, secure boot, boot time, etc.



Doing it right





Getting Certified

- ▶ The certification is made by an authority
- ▶ Designing a robust system is only the first step
- ▶ You also need to show the authority that the design is indeed robust, doesn't have any gap, is reviewed, tested, documented, etc.
- ▶ The certification attestation is then published for a given version



Missing Pieces

- ▶ There's still some parts of upstream Linux that don't provide FFI
 - Userspace Buffer Allocations APIs
 - GPU scheduling constraints
 - Clock Framework tree rate changes
- ▶ Missing/incomplete features
 - OpenGL / Vulkan SC
 - Fault-Tolerant V4L2
 - Virtualized everything
 - Being able to still display something when the compositor crashed



Questions?



Thank you

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